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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the great proportion of workplace-related litigation in Brazil,1 
employment discrimination litigation is almost nonexistent, which is in 
sharp contrast to what happens in the United States.  In the United States, 
employment discrimination cases correspond to 43.6% of all labor and 
employment litigation in federal trial courts.2  On the other hand, I have 
seen very few cases of discrimination throughout my practice as a labor 
judge in Brazil,3 and that is the general perception in the Labor courts.  Is it 
because Brazilian law effectively prevents discrimination from happening?  
Is it because, for some reason, these cases do not even reach the courts?  If 
the latter is true, how can Brazil improve enforcement of anti-
discrimination policies?   
Through its focus on gender discrimination, this paper argues that, 
although such discrimination does exist in Brazil, it is not significantly 
litigated because:   
(A) There are other easier-to-litigate causes of action with 
satisfactory remedies;  
(B) The lack of more aggressive truth-finding procedures hinders 
the uncovering of essential evidence;  
(C) Money judgments are proportionally smaller and may not 
compensate litigating the more complex cases; and  
(D) The current statutory text and the lack of binding precedent 
limit the litigation possibilities.   
This paper also argues that such issues could be partly resolved by 
adopting a new anti-discrimination bill currently pending in the Brazilian 
Congress, through an increased focus of prosecutors on gender 
discrimination and by gender equality information campaigns.4   
Part II provides some background, summarizing the relevant 
constitutional and statutory provisions, which shows that Brazil does have 
                                                      
1. To illustrate the proportion of the litigation in Brazil related to workplace law, the Labor 
Justice (Justiça do Trabalho), segment of the Brazilian Judiciary that has such subject matter 
jurisdiction, receives 21.3% of the Judiciary’s budget and has 20.5% of the 16,429 Brazilian judges.  See 
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS,32, 34 (2014) (Braz.) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN 
NUMBERS].  Although the Labor Justice’s pending cases amount to 8.3% (7.8 million) of the national 
cases in absolute numbers, the labor cases generally join several claims, whereas the other segments of 
the Judiciary often deal with single claim cases.  Thus, it is fair to estimate labor and employment cases 
in Brazil as roughly one fifth of the actual workload in courts.  Id. at 35. 
2. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
3. Since 2007, acting in the labor courts of a state capital and of several midsize and small 
cities.  
4. Lei No. 6.653, de 15 de Dezembro de 2009, PROJETO DE LEI [P.L.] de 16.12.2009 (Braz.). 
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laws against gender discrimination.  Part III answers the first question 
above in the negative, finding that gender discrimination in Brazil exists in 
proportion equal to or superior to that of the United States, despite that such 
cases are rarely litigated.  As to the second question, the answer is 
affirmative:  cases are rarely litigated because there are factors that prevent 
most of the discrimination victims from suing.  Without the intention of 
exhausting this complex inquiry, Part IV proposes four explanations to the 
issue.   
First, Brazilian legislation grants other easier-to-litigate causes of 
action and remedies that will otherwise compensate the gender 
discrimination victim, thereby reducing the focus on gender discrimination 
theories.5  Second, the lack of more aggressive evidence gathering 
procedures such as those present in the United States makes it more 
difficult to prove discrimination cases in Brazil.6  Third, the lower damages 
usually awarded in Brazil do not provide a large enough incentive to litigate 
discrimination cases, unlike in the United States where the monetary 
incentives are great.7  Last, the current anti-discrimination statutory text in 
Brazil is more limited in scope than American anti-discrimination law.8  As 
a possible course of action to address the problem, Part V proposes the 
passing of a bill that is waiting to be voted on by the Brazilian Congress 
since 2009.9  It also proposes an increased focus on gender discrimination 
by public prosecutors who have special discovery powers not available to 
private attorneys.10  Finally, it argues for the promotion of campaigns to 
increase awareness about workplace gender discrimination among 
employers and employees.   
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON GENDER 
EQUALITY IN BRAZIL 
A. Gender Equality and the Protection of Motherhood in the Brazilian 
Constitution  
While the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
limits only state action,11 the Brazilian Constitution grants equality and 
                                                      
5. See infra notes 99–112 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 113–26 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 128–33 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra Part II, Section B. 
9. See infra notes 142–48 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
11. “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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other civil and social rights as causes of action both against the government 
and private entities.12  The 1988 Constitution contains an extensive and 
detailed enumeration of rights.13  For instance, it grants civil rights and 
liberties (art. 5), as well as social rights (arts. 6–11), with special attention 
to employment and labor rights.14   
As to equality, the Brazilian Constitution forbids discrimination 
without limitation to an explicit list of protected classes.  It states as a 
“fundamental objective” of the country to “promote the well-being of all, 
without prejudice as to origin, race, sex, color, age and any other forms of 
discrimination.”15  It also prescribes that “the law shall punish any 
discrimination violating fundamental rights and liberties.”16   
                                                      
12. Alice Monteiro de Barros, DISCRIMINAÇÃO NO EMPREGO POR MOTIVO DE SEXO 
[EMPLOYMENT DISCTIMINATION BASED ON GENDER], DISCRIMINAÇÃO [DISCRIMINATION] 59, 66 
(RENAULT, VIANA, & CANTELLI eds., 2d ed., 2010) (Braz.).  On a historical note, in the 20th century, 
Brazil has adopted five different constitutions—in 1934, 1937, 1946, 1967, and in 1988.  Id.  The 
Constitutions of 1934, 1946, 1967 and 1988 all forbade different wages for equal work on the basis of 
sex.  Id.  The 1937 one, despite having an equal protection clause, did not explicitly prohibited gender 
based wage differences (as the other ones did), which opened the way for the enactment of the 
presidential “decree-law” 2.548, in 1940.  Id.   Such decree authorized employers to pay women lower 
wages than men by 10%.  Id.  That is a reminder of why Brazil and other Latin American countries tend 
to enact long and detailed bill of rights in their Constitutions:  to use the harder-to-change Constitution 
to protect social advancements, such as gender equality, from future attempts to eliminate them.  
13. See generally CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. (Braz.).  The 
creation of rights and protections for the citizens spreads through almost half of its 250 articles, along 
with detailed government structuring, checks and balances.  Id.  The 1988 Constitution was an attempt 
to reorganize the Brazilian legal system after twenty years of authoritarian military rule, and to make 
sure that democracy and the respect for civil and social rights would endure.  See generally C.F. pmbl.; 
see also C.F., translated in BRAZIL’S CONSTITUTION OF 1988 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2014 
(Keith S. Rosenn ed., Constitute Project, 2014).  All the transcribed text of the Brazilian constitution 
hereinafter is quoted from Keith Rosenn’s version in English, except for some eventual different word 
choices, by the author, based on the original text in Portuguese.   
14. C.F. arts. 5, 6–11. Although article 6 lists as social rights “education, health, nutrition, 
work, housing, leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and childhood, and assistance 
to the destitute,” articles 7 through 11 show a special concern with employment and labor rights.  C.F. 
art. 6–11.  Despite the fact that many of these prescribed rights granting provisions could not 
immediately generate public policy, due to budget limitations, they still went beyond the mere 
aspirational aspect.  According to most accepted Brazilian constitutional scholars, all constitutional 
provisions have immediate force, at least to command consistent interpretation of present legislation, to 
repeal inconsistent legislation, and to guide future legislation and policy making.  See, e.g., Luís Roberto 
Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere:  Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the Transnational 
Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 356 (2012). 
15. C.F. art. 3, § IV. (emphasis added). 
16. C.F. art. 5, § XLI.  
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There is special attention to gender equality, as “men and women have 
equal rights and duties under the terms of this Constitution.”17  However, 
such attention is not limited to prohibiting discrimination; it also grants 
some rights specifically to women, attempting to provide for substantive 
equality.18  The Constitution grants “maternity leave without loss of job or 
wages for a period of one hundred and twenty days,” and forbids discharge 
without cause from the date the pregnancy is confirmed until five months 
after birth.19  Finally, the Constitution grants  “protection of the job market 
for women through specific incentives, as provided by law;”20 and the 
“prohibition of any difference in pay in performance of duties and in hiring 
criteria by reason of sex, age, color or marital status.”21   
                                                      
17. C.F. art. 5, § I. 
18. See C.F. art. 7.  One important observation is that this equality is not absolute, being 
subordinate to the other guidelines prescribed by the Constitution.  Among Brazilian scholars and case 
law it is agreed that the equality here is substantive (isonomia material), and not merely formal 
(isonomia formal), thus allowing affirmative actions or reverse discrimination to level the playing field 
and eliminating effects of past discrimination.  Cf. Christopher DiSchino, Affirmative Action in Brazil:  
Reverse Discrimination and the Creation of a Constitutionally Protected Color-Line, 17 U. MIAMI 
INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 155, 174 (2010) (citing S.T.J.J., Ap. No. 2003/0151040-1, Relator:  Min. Luiz 
Fux, 10.02.2004, 182, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICA [R.S.T.J.] 120 de 25.02.2004 
(Braz.)) (citing decision of the Superior Tribunal of Justice, S.T.J., upholding the constitutionality of a 
quota system in state universities, reasoning that affirmative action is a “‘legitimate human interest’ in 
line with the constitutional principle of isonomia, or equality under the law, which mandates 
compensation for past discrimination that created current racial inequalities”).  
19. C.F. art. 7, § XVIII; ATO DAS DISPOSIÇÕES CONSTITUCIONAIS TRANSITÓRIAS [A.D.C.T.] 
[TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ACT] art. 10, § II(b) (Braz.).  Besides the for cause 
discharge, the literal text actually creates another exception, a discharge that is not “arbitrary.”  Id.  
However, because no statute yet defines what would be a non arbitrary discharge as to pregnant 
employees, the courts have been ruling that the only exception to this tenure rule is the for cause 
discharge based on the disciplinary violations in article 482 of the Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho.  
Decreto No. 5.452, de 1 de Maio de 1943, CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 482 de 
1.5.1943 (Braz.); MAURÍCIO GODINHO DELGADO, CURSO DE DIREITO DO TRABALHO 1, 1167 (3d ed. 
2004).  
20. C.F. art. 7, § XX.  This provision not only authorizes affirmative action and other policies 
to eliminate gender based discrimination, but actually mandates the branches of government to act, 
legislating or creating programs that will reach such result.  Id.  However, despite some legislative 
efforts, see infra Part II, Section B, the results are clearly insufficient, as Part III below demonstrates. 
21. C.F. art. 7, § XXX. 
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B. Statutory Provisions Relating to Gender Equality and Protection of 
Motherhood in Brazil and the United States 
At the statutory level, Law 9.029/95 is the functional equivalent to 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).22  It prohibits 
discriminatory practices restricting “access or maintenance of an 
employment relationship because of sex, origin, race, color, marital status, 
family status or age.”23  Such protected classes are similar to the ones in 
Title VII, except for the omission of religion and the inclusion of age.24  
Brazilian law considers it a discriminatory practice to require statements or 
medical exams regarding sterilization, pregnancy status, or to inducement 
of birth control.25  Additionally, notwithstanding other available relief, it 
gives the wrongfully discharged employee the option to be reinstated with 
back pay, or not to be reinstated and receive doubled back pay.26   
Further, Law 9.799/99 amends the Consolidation of Labor Laws 
(C.L.T.) to refine the list of unlawful discriminatory practices, such as 
prohibiting the use of protected classes when advertising jobs and 
discharging or refusing employment.27  The C.L.T allows an exception in 
cases where the nature of the activity is “notorious and publicly 
incompatible” with such classes, which is loosely equivalent to a bona fide 
occupational qualification found in the United States’ own Title VII.28  
Additionally, it defines as unlawful the use of those classes as a 
determining factor to promote and define compensation and training 
opportunities.29  Finally, the statute also clears the way for affirmative 
action.  It allows temporary measures to promote gender equality, to correct 
                                                      
22. See infra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
23. Lei No. 9.029, de 13 de Abril de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 1 de 
17.4.1995 (Braz.). 
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(1) (2012). 
25. Lei No. 9.029 D.O.U. art. 2 (Braz.). 
26. Id. art. 4. 
27. Lei No. 9.799, de 26 de Maio de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.5.1999 
(Braz.) (provisions functionally equivalent to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d)); Decreto No. 5.452, 
de 1 de Maio de 1943 CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 373-A (Braz.). 
28. Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 373-A, § I (Braz.).  According to Title VII, in the United 
States it is not an unlawful employment practice to make employment decisions on the basis of 
someone’s religion, sex, or national origin when these are a “bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(e). 
29. Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T.  art. 373-A, §§ I–III (Braz.). 
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the distortions that affect training, access to employment, and working 
conditions of women.30   
In the United States, Title VII addresses gender discrimination.31  Title 
VII defines several important terms used throughout the Act and clarifies 
that discrimination “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” includes but is 
not limited to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.32  It regulates 
unlawful employment practices, such as to discharge, refuse to hire or 
otherwise “discriminate against an individual with respect to […] terms 
[…] of employment because of this individual’s […] sex”, or other listed 
protected class.33  However, Title VII allows an employer to make 
employment decisions based on a protected class if it is a “bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business […].”34  It also regulates disparate impact, where a 
particular practice causes disparate impact on the basis of a protected class 
and the respondent fails to demonstrate that such class is a business 
necessity, or refuses to adopt an alternative practice.35  Finally, among other 
important provisions, Title VII forbids retaliation against individuals 
because they opposed unlawful employment practices, or participated in 
any proceeding under Title VII.36   
Though Brazilian legislation forbids gender discrimination, it confers 
certain benefits to women for their maternal roles, as a means to protect 
family and to compensate for the disadvantages women suffer in the 
workplace due to childbearing.37  For instance, women in Brazil are entitled 
to paid maternity leave of 120 days.38  It is a social security benefit, where 
                                                      
30. Id. art. 373-A, sole para. 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
32. Id. § 2000e(k).  
33. Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
34. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
35. Id. § 2000e-2(k). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
37. See DELGADO, supra note 19, at 781.  After the 1988 Constitution, some previous 
provisions deemed excessively restrictive, paternalistic or discriminatory to women were repealed, 
while protections related to motherhood remained.  Id.  For instance, Law 7,855/1989 repealed statutory 
provisions authorizing the father or husband to interfere in an adult woman’s employment contract, 
demanding that women went through certain medical examinations, and limiting women in certain types 
of work.  Id.  That followed international trends, where excessive state intervention was regarded as a 
cause of discrimination by employers and as an obstacle for the progress of women in the labor market.  
See Eduardo Gabriel Saad, Da Proteção do Trabalho da Mulher [Protection of Women’s Work], in 
CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO COMENTADA 1, 458 (JOSÉ EDUARDO DUARTE SAAD & ANA 
MARIA SAAD CASTELO BRANCO eds., 47th ed., 2014) (Braz.). 
38. C.F. art. 7, § XVIII; Decreto No. 5.452, de 1 de Maio de 1943, CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS 
DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 392 de 01.05.1943 (Braz.). 
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the employer directly pays the usual wages to the employee but 
compensates the corresponding amount with other social security taxes 
owed.39  Additionally, women have tenure from the date the pregnancy is 
confirmed until five months after birth.40  This temporary job security 
allows the returning employee to have her job back, which otherwise would 
have been likely filled, and at least a month to show her value at work.  
Women may also benefit from unlimited paid sick days or disability 
leave.41  Even though this benefit is also available to men, it proves to be 
very important for women with pregnancy complications.42  Finally, 
without loss of wages and other rights, pregnant women have the right to be 
accommodated to another position when health conditions so require, as 
long as they are restored to the previous position after maternity leave.43   
In contrast, there is no paid maternity leave mandated in the United 
States at the federal level, and only a few American states have enacted 
some form of paid maternity leave. 44  The Family and Medical Leave Act 
(F.M.L.A.) grants an unpaid leave of eighty-four days (twelve weeks).45  
Though the F.M.L.A. does not provide a pregnant woman with job security, 
                                                      
39. Lei No. 8.213, de 24 de julho de 1991, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 71–73 de 
25.7.1991 (Braz.).  Despite being a great conquest of society on behalf motherhood, paid maternity 
leave was itself a cause of discrimination.  Until the seventies, funding maternity leave was a great 
burden to the employer.  Employers then tried to avoid such burden by not hiring married women, and it 
was not uncommon for women that got married to hide it from their employers.  That only changed with 
the enactment of Law 6,136/1974, which turned paid maternity leave into a social security benefit.  Id. 
art. 71.  Thereafter, there was a considerable increase of women participation in the labor market.  See 
Saad, supra note 37, at 467. 
40. Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 391-A (Braz.) (referencing ATO DAS DISPOSIÇÕES 
CONSTITUCIONAIS TRANSITÓRIAS [A.D.C.T.] art. 10, § II(b) (Braz.)). 
41. Lei No. 8.213 D.O.U. art. 60, § 3 (Braz).   The employer, upon a showing of medical 
examination documents,  pays up to fifteen consecutive days, and the days thereafter are paid as a social 
security benefit.  Id.  That is not without some friction between employees and employers, who 
complain that some employees abuse of such right. 
42. Id. 
Art. 60.  Paid sick leave [auxílio-doença, literally, sickness aid] will be due to the 
insured employee from the sixteenth day of removal from the activity, and, in the 
case of other insured persons, from the date of the beginning of the incapacity as 
long as he remains incapacitated . . . §3 During the first fifteen consecutive days 
following the departure of the activity due to illness, the company will be 
responsible for paying the insured employee his full salary.   Id. 
43. Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 392, § 4 (Braz.). 
44. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (2009); see Adrienne Lu, Paid Family Leave Now Law in N.J., THE 
PHILA. INQUIRER (May 3, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-05-03/news/24989936_1_philip-
kirschner-paid-family-leave-weeks-of-unpaid-family. 
45. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A). 
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at least she is entitled to the same position held before taking leave.46  
Additionally, a discharge shortly after an F.M.L.A. leave would raise a 
strong case of interference with F.M.L.A. rights, entitling the employee to 
reinstatement, damages, attorney’s fees and costs. 47  As to the period prior 
to the leave, a discharged pregnant woman would have to go through the 
difficult task of proving employment discrimination in American courts.48   
C. Prospective Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
There is a bill, P.L. 6.653/09, for a more comprehensive anti-
discrimination statute waiting to be voted on in the Brazilian House of 
Representatives (Câmara dos Deputados) since 2009.49  Despite the special 
attention to gender discrimination, its coverage is broad, expressing a non-
exhaustive list of protected classes.  It prohibits all discriminatory treatment 
“between women and men, based on gender, sexual orientation, race, 
ethnicity, racial origin, age, origin, physical appearance, health status, 
disability, political opinions, membership of political parties and trade 
unions, customs, religious beliefs, among others.”50   
P.L. 6.653/09 defines discriminatory practices broadly as any actions 
based on differential treatment,51 and defines indirect discrimination 
(resembling Title VII’s definition of disparate impact52) as:   
an attitude, criteria, provision or policy that, despite apparently 
neutral, put female or male workers in comparative disadvantage, 
except for acts justified by the performance of different functions 
in the company's hierarchy, or as affirmative actions to 
compensate for an uneven situation and achieve equality of 
treatment.53   
P.L. 6.653/09 also mandates affirmative actions to compensate and 
ensure equality between women and men.54  It requires policies for sharing 
and balancing work and family responsibilities, and for establishing training 
                                                      
46. Id. § 2614(a)(1) (2008). 
47. Id. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a)(1), (3) (2008). 
48. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
49. Lei No. 6.653/09, de 15 de Dezembro de 2009, PROJETO DE LEI [P.L.] de 16.12.2009 
(Braz.). 
50. Id. art. 2, § 1. 
51. Id. art. 4. 
52. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
53. Lei No. 6.653/09 P.L. art. 4, sole para. 
54. Id. art. 2, § 3, art. 3. 
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and grievance procedures related to sexual harassment and bullying.55  It 
also attempts to deter discriminatory behavior through the denial of public 
financing and exposure of employers, who violate those policies, in a 
publicized list. 56  Additionally, P.L. 6.653/09 defines workplace bullying as 
“any improper conduct that is repetitive and prolonged, exposing female 
and male workers to humiliating and embarrassing situations, violating their 
dignity and psychological integrity, affecting the directly offended person's 
work and the group’s productivity as a result of the deterioration of the 
working environment.”57   
Finally, P.L. 6.653/09 innovates by mandating employers to create 
internal commissions for the promotion of equality, composed equally of 
employees elected by their peers and employees nominated by the 
employer.58  Its members would be tenured for up to one year after 
finishing their one-year term.59  Additionally, they would have powers to 
disseminate equality information, to create an Equality Plan, and to check 
the employer’s compliance with the plan, as well as all pertinent 
administrative regulations.60   
III. DESPITE BEING RARELY LITIGATED IN BRAZIL, GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION DOES EXIST IN PROPORTIONS EQUIVALENT OR SUPERIOR 
TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. Gender-Based Employment Discrimination in Brazil is Seldom 
Litigated  
Despite the fact that approximately one-fifth of all litigation in Brazil 
relates to the workplace,61 the number of gender-based employment 
discrimination claims that reach the labor courts is minimal.62  Although 
                                                      
55. Id. art. 5, arts. 25–26. 
56. Id. arts. 23–24. 
57. Id. art. 27. 
58. Lei No. 6.653/09 P.L art. 34. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. JUSTICE IN NUMBERS, supra note 1, at 35. 
62.  
The [Brazilian] Judiciary consists of:  (I) the Supreme Federal Tribunal [S.T.F.]; 
(I-A) the National Council of Justice [C.N.J.]; (II) the Superior Tribunal of Justice 
[S.T.J]; (III) the Federal Regional Tribunals and the Federal Judges; (IV) the 
Labor Tribunals and the Labor Judges; (V) the Electoral Tribunals and the 
Electoral Judges; (VI) the Military Tribunals and the Military Judges; (VII) the 
Tribunals and Judges of the states, the Federal District and the Territories.  C.F. 
art. 92, §§ I–VII.  
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there are no statistics specific to such employment discrimination cases, it is 
possible to arrive at such conclusion looking at the number of cases 
identified by topics or legal issues where employment discrimination might 
be contained.  An eloquent illustration is the following 2014 data from the 
highest Brazilian labor court:63   
 
 Code Issues that might contain employment discrimination causes of action 
T.S.T. 
Quantity  
T.S.T. 
    % 
2697 Salary differences due to equal pay mandate 10,706 4.0%  
55184 Salary differences due to denied promotion 4,146 1.5% 
2656 Reinstatement, readmission or front pay 2,888 1.1%  
1723 Moral damages due to moral harassment 2,351 0.9%  
2435 Indirect discharge (fault committed by employer) 2,094 0.8%  
1978 Reinstatement, readmission or front pay due to pregnancy job security  1,066 0.4%  
55028 Salary differences due to equal pay mandate (bank workers) 680 0.3%  
55193 Void discharge 502 0.2%  
55216 Collective moral damages 446 0.2%  
9051 Moral damages due to void for cause discharge 351 0.1% 
1966 
Discriminatory discharge (may include 
retaliation for all employment suits, but not 
only for employment discrimination) 
339 0.1%  
                                                      
The Labor Court System consists of:  (I) the Superior Labor Tribunal [situated in 
the national capital, last instance for issues of workplace law, except for 
constitutional challenges, when its decisions may be subject of extraordinary 
appeals to the Supreme Federal Tribunal, S.T.F.]; (II) Regional Labor Tribunals 
[appellate labor court, usually one per state capital]; (III) Labor Judges.  C.F. art. 
111, §§ I–III.   
In Brazil, labor courts are responsible for adjudging:  (I) actions arising from 
work relations (either employment relations or individual independent contractors 
working for another enterprise); (II) actions involving the right to strike; (III) 
actions concerning union representation; (IV) writs of mandamus, habeas corpus 
and habeas data (access to information suits) within this subject matter; (V) 
jurisdictional conflicts among labor courts; (VI) economic or non-economic 
damage claims stemming from work relations; (VII) claims relating to 
administrative penalties imposed by labor inspection agencies; (VIII) collection 
of payroll social contributions and related fines; (IX) other controversies 
stemming from work relations, as provided by law.  C.F. art. 114, §§ I–IX.   
63. TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DO TRABALHO [T.S.T.], COORDENADORIA DE ESTASTÍSTICA E 
PESQUISA DO, ACERVO POR ASSUNTO, de 31.12.2014 (Braz.) [hereinafter T.S.T. STATISTICS]. 
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55214 Moral damages due to discriminatory action 313 0.1% 
55082 Women (especially protected worker) 242 0.1%  
55421 Moral damages due to body or personal belongings search 207 0.1%  
1724 Moral damages due to sexual harassment 80 0.0%  
55417 Moral damages due to restricting the use of restroom 63 0.0%  
8812 Maternity-leave salary 30 0.0%  
55331 Maternity leave 14 0.0%  
 
 Out of the 270,424 cases before the T.S.T. in 2014,64 the cases that 
actually involve gender-based employment discrimination, might be less 
than 0.5%.65  Despite the fact that the sum of the percentages in the table 
above would nominally reach 9.8% of the total, several claims are usually 
joined in the same complaint, and none relate exclusively to employment 
discrimination.66  Discounting such situations, employment discrimination 
cases could be estimated at about 1% of the litigation in labor courts.67  
Gender-based discrimination (presumably not more than half of such cases) 
are likely not more than 0.5% of the labor courts’ workload.68  Therefore, 
employment discrimination suits correspond to no more than 0.48% of the 
total federal litigation in Brazil, and gender-based discrimination suits to no 
more than 0.24%.69   
                                                      
64. See generally Cesar Zucatti Pritsch, The Brazilian Appellate Procedure Through Common 
Law Lenses:  How American Standards of Review May Help Improve Brazilian Civil Procedure, 48 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 56 (2017) (discussing the amazing quantity of appeals handled by the 
Brazilian appellate courts, and possible tools to reduce them)  
65. As covered in Title VII, see supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra note 64–65 and accompanying text.  For instance, “salary differences due to 
equal pay mandate” might be due to gender or race discrimination, but often they are not.  See T.S.T. 
STATISTICS, supra note 63.  An employee who has been hired for a certain function at a certain wage, 
might end up performing more complex activities without receiving the correspondent wage increase.  If 
another employee earns more for equivalent work (despite equivalent seniority), the employer is liable 
for this salary difference even without the intention to discriminate because of this employee’s protected 
class status.  In another example, the denial of a promotion might be unlawful due to discrimination, but 
it also may stem from a mere violation of a seniority agreements.   
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  Since there is no separate employment 
discrimination cases statistics in Brazil, the author used his professional experience to break up the 
available numbers into an estimate of the discrimination cases within such numbers.  
68. Id. 
69. Id.  In 2013, the labor intermediate appellate courts handled 648,478 appeals while the 
federal intermediate appellate courts handled 499,244 appeals.  CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, 
JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2014 ANO-BASE 2013:  JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO,  [THE JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 
2014 BASED ON 2013:  LABOR JUSTICE] 108 (2013) (Braz.) [hereinafter JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2013]; 
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In sharp contrast, the proportion of employment discrimination cases 
in the United States is much higher.  Employment discrimination amounts 
to 3.7% of federal litigation (7.6 times more than in Brazil) and 43.6% of 
all labor and employment federal cases (proportionally 43.6 times more 
than in Brazil). 70  There are no specific statistics when it comes to gender 
discrimination claims in the American courts.  However, the proportion of 
the gender discrimination charges to the total of discrimination charges 
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) may 
provide some insight. 71  Assuming that discrimination complaints are filed 
in federal courts in similar proportions to those in the E.E.O.C., gender 
discrimination claims are 30% of the employment discrimination litigation, 
and 13.8% of the federal labor and employment litigation.72  Therefore, 
gender discrimination in the United States is twenty-five times more 
litigated than in the Brazilian labor courts.   
B. Gender Discrimination in the Labor Market in Brazil 
Looking at the very low numbers of employment discrimination 
litigation in Brazil, one could think that Brazil is free of discrimination, but 
that is still distant from reality.  Women correspond to 76% of male 
individuals in the labor force (in the United States, women make up 85% of 
male idividuals in the labor force).73  Despite being more educated than 
                                                      
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2014:  JUSTIÇA FEDERAL [THE JUDICIARY IN 
NUMBERS 2014:  FEDERAL JUSTICE] 77 (2013) (Braz.) [hereinafter JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2014].  
Thus, labor appeals were 57% of the total federal litigation at appellate courts. See JUDICIARY IN 
NUMBERS 2014, supra note 69; JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2013, supra note 69. 
70. Considering the total numbers of tables D and C-2, in the fiscal year of 2014 there were a 
total of 372,542 cases pending at the U.S. District Courts, and the employment discrimination cases are 
in table C-2 under the labels “Civil Rights:  Employment”, and “Civil Rights:  ADA-Employment,” 
which totaled 13,881 cases in the fiscal year 2014.  See U.S. COURTS, Table D. Cases:  U.S. Dist. 
Courts—Criminal Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending (Including Transfers) During the 12-
Month Periods Ending June 30, 2013 and 2014, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files 
/statistics_import_dir/D00CJun14.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2017); see U.S. COURTS, Table C-2. U.S. Dist. 
Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month 
Periods Ending June 30, 2013 and 2014, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics 
_import_dir/C02Jun14.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) (explaining 13,881 employment discrimination 
cases out of a total of 31,858 labor and employment cases—“Civil Rights:  Employment”, “Civil Rights:  
ADA-Employment,” and “Labor Laws, Total”). 
71. Charge Statistics (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2014, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2017). 
72. Id. 
73. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 497 (Klaus Schwab, ed., 
2013).  On a comparative note, one would think that a higher participation of women in the labor market 
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men, women earn less.74  Women earned only 65% of what men earned in 
2000, 68% in 2010, 72.8% in 2012 and 73.7% in 2013.75  This shows a 
trend to reduce the gap, but there is still a great disparity.76  That becomes 
especially clear in comparison to the United States, where in 2012 women’s 
median weekly earnings were 81% compared to those of men.77  Curiously, 
among the better-educated segment, the difference in Brazil is higher.78 
                                                      
is an indicator of a more progressive or developed society, and of better working conditions and wages 
for women.  However, statistics show that a higher ratio is not a good proxy for the development of the 
country, because there are developed and developing countries which fall above and below the United 
States and Brazil when it comes to the ratio of women to men in the labor force.  See id.  For instance:  
Mozambique 1.05; Rwanda 1.02; Norway 0.94; Cambodia 0.93; Kazakhstan and Canada 0.91; 
Botswana 0.90; China 0.88; Germany 0.86; Zambia 0.85; U.S. 0.86; Angola and Spain 0.82; Peru 0.81; 
Singapore and Brazil 0.76; Japan 0.74; Greece 0.73; Italy 0.69; Chile 0.66; Mexico 0.56; Turkey 0.40; 
India 0.36; Egypt 0.32 and Algeria 0.21.  Id.   
74. See INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA, ESTATÍSTICAS DE GÊNERO:  
UMA ANÁLISE DOS RESULTADOS DO CENSO DEMOGRÁFICO 2010 [GENDER STATISTICS:  AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE 2010 DEMOGRAPHIC CENSUS RESULTS] 33, Gráfico [Graffic] 28 (2014) (Braz.).  In 2010, among 
Brazilians between 18 and 24 years old, 41.1% of men had dropped out of high school, but only 31.9% 
of women did the same, and while only 11.3% of men attended college, 15.1% of women did so.  Id.  
Among women of 25 years old and above, 12.5% had completed a college education, but only 9.9% of 
men in such age group did the same.  Id. 
75. Id. at Tabela [Table] 26.  This illustrates another major type of employment discrimination 
in Brazil—discrimination based on race.  See id.  Despite the celebrated notion that Brazil is a “racial 
democracy,” blacks and other dark-skinned citizens usually receive inferior opportunities in life and 
have limited access to higher paying jobs.  See, e.g., Benjamin Hensler, Não Vale a Pena? (Not Worth 
the Trouble?) Afro-Brazilian Workers and Brazilian Anti-Discrimination Law, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 267, 270 (2007) (arguing that this “racial democracy” ideology has actually been harmful 
to Afro-Brazilians, both disadvantaging their attempts to challenge discrimination in the courts, and 
handicapping their collective efforts to develop a broader grass-roots movement for racial equality).  
INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA, PESQUISA NACIONAL POR AMOSTRA DE 
DOMICÍLOS:  SÍNTESE DE INDICADORES 2014 [NATIONAL SURVEY ON HOUSEHOLD SAMPLES:  
SNYTHESIS OF INDICATORS 2014] 71 (2015) (Braz.). 
76. At the lower end of the wage spectrum, for example, only 21.1% of the occupied men 
earned the Brazilian minimum wage, whereas that rate was 29.8% for women.  Id. 
77. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN LABOR FORCE:  A 
DATABOOK REPORT 1049, 2 (2014). 
78. Women with up to 8 years of schooling earn 71.4% of men’s wages, but that ratio is 
68.7% for 9–11 years of education, and 66.1% for 12 or more years of education.  ANA LUCIA SABOIA, 
CAPACITAÇÃO PARA OS MECANISMOS DE GÊNERO NO GOVERNO FEDERAL [TRAINING FOR GENDER 
MECHANISMS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT],  LIGUE 180 CENTRAL DE ATENDIMENTO À MULHER 
[LEAGUE 180 SERVICE CENTER FOR WOMEN] 57 (1st ed., 2014) (Braz.);  see also LÉA ELISA 
SILINGOWSCHI CALIL, DIREITO DO TRABALHO DA MULHER:  A QUESTÃO DA IGUALDADE JURÍDICA 
ANTI A DESIGUALDADE FÁTICA [WOMEN’S LABOR LAW:  THE QUESTION OF LEGAL EQUALITY 
AGAINST FACIAL INEQUALITY] 110–11 (2007).  Such trend does not occur in the United States, where 
women with less than a high school diploma earn 76% of what men do, but women with a high school 
diploma or more earned 78% of men’s compensation.  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 77, at 59–60. 
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Explanations for the wage gap in Brazil are not clear.  Common sense 
would suggest that cheap child-care and paid pregnancy leave would reduce 
the disadvantages of Brazilian women in the workplace, thereby reducing 
the wage gap. 79  However, the smaller wage difference in United States—
where such benefits are not mandated by law—negates such an 
assumption.80  While examining “family life” variables, a commentator 
found that maternity or marriage, by itself, was not as determinant as the 
hours actually spent performing domestic tasks, which disproportionately 
burden women and greatly affect income.81  In 2003, Brazilian women 
dedicated a weekly average of 24 hours to domestic tasks—while men, only 
10 hours.82  In 2012, this burden was slightly smaller, with 21 weekly hours 
for women and the same 10 hours for men.83  Those hours reflect the gender 
roles perpetuated in Brazilian culture, where it is often the woman’s duty to 
care for children and the elderly.84  Even for upper-class women, who 
generally hire someone else to perform these tasks, this lesser-paid 
domestic work is performed by another woman, contributing to the wage 
gap.85   
Another possible explanation for the wage gap is a horizontal 
differentiation of work based on the notion of “masculine” or “feminine” 
jobs in Brazilian culture.86  Taking college majors as an illustration of such 
gender-specific job choices, women were 91.3% of the total enrollments in 
Pedagogy, 82.9% in Nursing, and 80% in Languages—all lesser-paid areas 
                                                      
79. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
80. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.. 
81. Simone Wajnman, Gender Roles in Family and Earnings Differences in Brazil, in 
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION CONFERENCE 7–8 (2013).  
82. Id. 
83. Maira Covre Sussai Soares & Jadir Soares Junior, Divisão do Trabalho Doméstico nas 
Famílias Brasileiras:  Influências de Fatores Individuais e das Políticas Públicas [Division of Domestic 
Work in Brazilian Familes:  Influences of Individual Factors and Public Policies], in CONFERENCE:  
NATIONAL MEETING OF POPULATION STUDIES 5 (2014). 
84. See, e.g., Ancelmo Gois & Cláudio Duarte, Cuidar de Idosos Tira a Mulher do Trabalho 
[Caring for the Elderly Takes a Woman Away from Work], O GLOBO (Nov. 15, 2014) (reviewing ANA 
AMÉLIA CAMARANO, NOVO REGIME DEMOGRÁFICO:  UMA NOVA RELAÇÃO ENTRE POPULAÇÃO E 
DESENVOLVIMENTO? [NEW DEMOGRAPHIC REGIME:  A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT?] (2014) (noting that young children, especially up to two years are still a great 
barrier for women at the labor market, but that the aging of the population adds a new barrier:  who will 
stay home and take care of the elderly, for instance, with Parkinson or Alzheimer)). 
85. CALIL, supra note 78, at 111–12. 
86. Id. at 108–09. 
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in Brazil.87  In contrast, Engineering and Computer Science, usually better-
paid areas, proved to be very “masculine,” with only 20.3% and 18.8% of 
women enrollment in Brazil.88  Additionally, domestic workers, the least 
paid workers in Brazil, are almost exclusively women.89  While 15.5% of 
workingwomen are domestic workers, only 0.9% of workingmen perform 
such jobs.90   
Finally, within the same career or industry there is clearly a vertical 
wage differential, or the so-called “glass ceiling.”  A survey of the 500 
largest corporations in Brazil reveals that women do not usually reach the 
highest positions.91  At the executive level, only 13.7% are women.92  That 
is similar to the United States, where women hold only 14.6% of executive 
positions at Fortune 500 companies.93  The survey in Brazil also shows that 
there is no consistent trend of inclusion for women yet.  Although executive 
level female participation in Brazil rose from 6% (2001) to 13.7% (2010), 
at the supervision level women fell from 28% (2003) to 26.8% (2010).94  
Finally, the survey shows that there is either a lack of willingness or lack of 
management awareness about how to deal with such inequality.  Though 
55% of the surveyed companies’ presidents acknowledged insufficient 
proportion of women in the executive staff, only 4% of them had policies to 
incentivize women’s participation.95  Some presidents credited the low 
participation of women to the company’s lack of knowledge on how to 
handle the matter (49%).96  Others attributed it to the female candidates’ 
                                                      
87. Id.  In the middle of the spectrum are Social Communication (Journalism and Public 
Relations), Accounting, Business and Law, these proportions were respectively 56.6%, 50.7%, 49.2% 
and 41.3% of the numbers of men enrolled.  Id. 
88. Id.  “Occupational segregation” as to men and women performing different jobs also 
occurs in the United States.  For instance, over 90% of receptionists, dietitians, nutritionists, registered 
nurses, pre-school and kindergarten teachers are female, and over 90% of electrical and mechanical 
engineers, firefighters, mechanics, and pest exterminators are male.  Kingsley R. Browne, Mind Which 
Gap?  The Selective Concern over Statistical Sex Disparities, 8 FIU L. REV. 271, 281 (2013).  
89. CALIL, see supra note 78, at 108–09. 
90. Id. 
91. INSTITUTO ETHOS [ETHOS INSTITUTE], SOCIAL, RACIAL AND GENDER PROFILE OF THE 500 
BRAZILIAN LARGEST COMPANIES AND THEIR AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 1, 8 (2010). 
92. Id. at 11. 
93. The 2013 Catalyst Census:  Fortune 500 Women Executive Officers and Top Earners, 
CATALYST (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2013-catalyst-census-fortune-500-
women-executive-officers-and-top-earners.  
94. INSTITUTO ETHOS, supra note 91, at 12. 
95. Id. at 26, 30. 
96. Id. at 30. 
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lack of professional qualification for the position (42%) and to women’s 
lack of interest for the positions (9%).97   
Therefore, gender-based employment discrimination in Brazil, despite 
not being significantly litigated, occurs in proportions equivalent or 
superior to those of the United States.  Then, why is it that these cases do 
not even reach the courts?  Part IV will take a closer look.   
IV. WHY ARE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS RARELY LITIGATED?  
Part III negatively answered the question as to whether Brazilian law 
effectively prevents discrimination from happening.  Although rarely 
litigated, gender discrimination does exist in numbers equivalent or superior 
to those of the United States.  If this is the case why are gender 
discrimination cases rarely litigated in Brazil?  Though the answer is not 
clear, this paper argues four possible explanations for the issue:   
(A) There are other easier-to-litigate causes of action with 
satisfactory remedies;  
(B) The lack of more aggressive truth-finding procedures hinders 
the uncovering of essential evidence;  
(C) Money judgments are proportionally smaller than in the 
United States and may not compensate litigating the more 
complex cases; and  
(D) The current statutory text and the lack of binding precedent 
limit the litigation possibilities. 
A. Brazilian Legislation Grants Other Easier-to-Litigate Causes of 
Action with Reasonable Remedies, Thereby Reducing the Incentives for 
Filing a More Complex Claim of Gender Discrimination 
While some cases in the United States would be litigated as 
employment discrimination claims, the same cases in Brazil may be 
brought under other more straightforward causes of action, without having 
discriminatory intent.  This subsection uses sexual harassment due to the 
abusive environment and the discriminatory discharge of a pregnant woman 
as examples. 
In the United States, in order for a plaintiff to succeed in a sexual 
harassment suit due to an abusive work environment there must be a 
sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct which offends a reasonable person, 
and the conduct was actually perceived as abusive by the plaintiff, affecting 
                                                      
97. Id. 
528             ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:3 
 
her terms of employment because of her sex.98  In Brazil, abusive 
environment harassment does not have to be necessarily because of sex but 
can be brought under a “moral harassment” claim.99  This claim has been 
defined as systematic and frequent psychological violence where someone 
tends to isolate the victim through humiliation, undermining his or her 
reputation and confidence.100  It does not only involve action by superiors, 
but even among colleagues, and the goal is usually to compel the victim to 
resign, retire, take a sick leave or ask for a transfer.101  Because it is a 
broader and easier to establish cause of action, “moral harassment” has 
been litigated in Brazil nine times more than discriminatory discharge, and 
thirty times more than sexual harassment.102   
As to the discriminatory discharge of a pregnant woman, in the United 
States there is no job security during pregnancy and relief depends on the 
ability to prove discriminatory intent. 103  Proving discriminatory intent in 
the United States may be a daunting task.  Many of the plaintiffs fail in 
summary judgment, where courts often ignore evidence of explicit bias, or 
“search for explicitly discriminatory policies and rogue actors […],” which 
is a rare paradigm in the twenty-first century.104  Evidence that an action 
was taken “because of” gender bias is usually circumstantial.105   
On the other hand, in Brazil there is almost an automatic win without 
the need to go through the intricacies of discriminatory intent.106  A 
pregnant woman may not be discharged without cause from the date that 
                                                      
98. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993); but see David C. Yamada, The 
Phenomenon of Workplace Bullying and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment 
Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000) (explaining the harms of workplace harassment in general and 
proposing a status-blind ban). 
99. See, e.g., TRT-3 [Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 3ª Região] [Regional Tribunal of 
Labour of the 3rd Region], RO 01292.2003,057.03.00.3, Relatora:  Des. Alice Monteiro de Barros, 
DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA DE MINAS GERAIS [D.J.M.G.] [Journal of Justice of Minas Gerais] 13 de 11.08.2004 
(Braz.). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. See supra note 63 and accompanying table. 
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (establishing that 
discrimination “because of sex” includes because of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condition 
. . .”).  To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a pregnant woman must show that:  “(1) she is 
a member of a protected class; (2) she was satisfactorily performing her job; (3) she was discharged; and 
(4) similarly situated persons not in her protected class were treated more favorably or that her position 
was filled by a person who was not pregnant.”  See, e.g., Fulkerson v. AmeriTitle, Inc., 64 F. App’x. 63, 
65 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).  
104. Nancy Gertner, Losers' Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111–12 (2012). 
105. Id. at 112.  
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.. 
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the pregnancy is confirmed until five months after the birth.107  If fired at 
any point during this tenure period, she has the right to reinstatement and 
back pay.108  Additionally, if litigation causes such distress that would 
render reinstatement ill-advised, the employee may waive reinstatement and 
receive the wages and benefits of the tenure period.109  As opposed to 
discrimination litigation, here the employer would not be able to assert a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason as a defense.110  The employer can 
only defeat such a claim by showing that the firing was based on a serious 
disciplinary violation, as defined in the law. 111  This may help explain why 
plaintiffs are four times more likely to sue for reinstatement or front pay 
based on pregnancy tenure than on discriminatory discharge, even though 
the discriminatory discharge theory allows for doubled back pay. 112   
B. The Lack of Aggressive Evidence Gathering Procedures Such as the 
Ones in the United States Makes It Much More Difficult to Prove Certain 
Discrimination Claims in Brazil 
Differences as to the evidence gathering process in Brazil and the 
United States may explain in part why, unless there is a “smoking gun” 
piece of evidence, discrimination cases are rarely litigated in Brazil.  As 
will be explained, Brazil’s civil procedure provides fewer means to uncover 
circumstantial evidence, which is sometimes the only kind of evidence 
available in an employment discrimination case.   
In the United States, there are aggressive discovery procedures for the 
request of documents,113 of written answers to interrogatories,114as well as 
                                                      
107. ATO DAS DISPOSIÇÕES CONSTITUCIONAIS TRANSITÓRIAS [A.D.C.T.] art. 10, § II(b) (Braz.); 
Decreto No. 5.452, de 1 de Maio de 1943, CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 391-A 
de 01.05.1943 (Braz.); see also supra note 38.  
108. TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DO TRABALHO [T.S.T], Súmula [Precedent] No. 244, Resolução 
[Decision] 185/2012, 14.09.2012, DIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO DA JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO [D.E.J.T.] [Online 
Journal of Labour Justice] de 27.09.2012 (Braz.). 
109. Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 496 (Braz.). 
110. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973). 
111. Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 482 (Braz.) (explaining those violations are:  (a) acts of 
dishonesty; (b) incontinence of conduct or wrongdoing; (c) unfair competition against the employer; (d) 
criminal conviction; (e) negligence; (f) habitual intoxication or intoxication during working hours; (g) 
violation of trade secrets; (h) indiscipline or insubordination; (i) job abandonment; (j-k) verbal or 
physical offenses, except in self-defense or defense of others; (l) constant gambling).   
112. See supra note 63 and accompanying table; Lei No. 9.029, de 13 de Abril de 1995, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 4, § II de 17.4.1995 (Braz.). 
113. At the federal level, see FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
114. See id.  Although not very suitable for truth finding, interrogatories may be useful to 
narrow down factual disputes, saving time and focusing discovery.  
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long attorney-led depositions.115  All of these discovery methods increase 
the likelihood of uncovering the truth.  They are enforced by possibly harsh 
procedural sanctions, including contempt of court, disciplinary procedures 
prosecuted by the Bar before the courts, and perjury prosecutions. 116  Thus, 
there are strong incentives to comply with discovery requests, to turn over 
to the other party even the most damaging documents, and to tell the truth 
in interrogatories or depositions.   
In Brazil, there is less enforcement of this truth-finding process.  
Successful perjury convictions are rare, as police departments’ and 
prosecutors’ scarce resources are not prioritized for the prosecution of 
perjury, and courts have developed lenient precedents as to perjury to 
manage overburdened dockets.117  Parties in Brazil are not considered 
witnesses, and thus cannot even be prosecuted for perjury. 118  There is also 
no imprisonment for contempt of court.119  Parties that lie might be fined as 
bad-faith litigants, but even these procedural sanctions are not sufficiently 
high120 and they are often reversed in the appellate courts, which review 
them de novo.121  Such features cause a low level of deterrence, allowing an 
undesirable lack of candor.  Additionally, there are no pre-trial out-of-court 
attorney-led depositions, but only much shorter inquiries by the judge at 
trial.122  This process may be useful to prove a party’s case, but rarely 
uncovers previously unknown information.  Finally, it is unusual for 
                                                      
115. See id. 30(d)(1) (“a deposition is limited to 1 day of 7 hours”).  In hours of inquiry, 
exploring contradictions the witness and her fear of committing perjury, an American attorney may 
discover substantial information that would not surface otherwise. 
116.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 37; see, e.g., Brian D. Burgoon, The Bar’s Procedure for 
Investigating and Prosecuting Disciplinary Complaints, FLA. BAR NEWS (Feb. 1, 2014), 
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/cb53c80c8fabd49d85256b5900678f6c/aed382f8a
be1ac7385257c670048bb12!OpenDocument. 
117. Observations based on anecdotal experience, as a Judge in Brazil. 
118. CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] art. 447, § 2, II de 3.2016 (Braz.). 
119. See generally C.P.C.; see also [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, LXVII (Braz.) (“there shall 
be no civil imprisonment for debt, except for a person who voluntarily and inexcusably defaults on a 
support obligation”). 
120. C.P.C. art. 81 (Braz.) (a fine between 1 and 10% of the amount in controversy, plus 
proven damages and attorney’s fees incurred by the other party, costs that, in Brazil, are usually not high 
enough to deter bad-faith litigation). 
121. C.P.C. arts. 1012–13; see also Pritsch, supra note 64 at 60. 
122. C.P.C. arts. 450–53.  In the labor courts’ procedure, parties may hear three witnesses each, 
in a schedule that usually will contain three to five trials in a same afternoon.  Id.; Decreto No. 5.452, de 
1 de Maio de 1943, CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 821 de 01.05.1943 (Braz.)  
Thus, witnesses may be heard in as little as five minutes or up to an hour in extreme cases.  This system, 
thus, does not allow attorneys to use witnesses to uncover new information, but only to present to the 
judge evidence to support their case.  See C.P.C. arts. 450–53. 
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attorneys to be sanctioned for litigation misconduct directly by the 
respective judge, who may report it to the Bar.123   
Considering these differences in the truth-finding process in both 
countries, one may understand why Brazil has not yet had many gender 
discrimination cases, where evidence is usually scarce and in the 
employer’s possession.  For instance, it is unlikely that a sex-based 
stereotyping case as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins124 would be successfully 
litigated in Brazil.  In Hopkins, remarks of the employer’s partners—that 
the plaintiff had to take “a course at charm school,” or to dress femininely 
and wear makeup—were key to the courts.125  Similar were the partners’ 
evaluations describing her as “macho” or suggesting that she was 
“overcompensated for being a woman.”126  In Brazil, relying on probable 
impunity, employers would likely withhold or deny the existence of 
documents containing such damaging statements.   
C. Smaller Judgment Awards in Brazil May Not Outweigh the Litigation 
Costs of the More Complex Discrimination Cases  
Another factor that might contribute to the low numbers of gender 
discrimination litigation in Brazil is the lower amount of judgment awards 
in comparison to the United States.  These lower judgments provide lesser 
incentives to litigate  the more complex discrimination cases.  For instance, 
in RR 11184048.2007.5.05.0020, the court voided the for-cause discharge 
of an employee with pregnancy complications, which had been harassed 
because of her condition and later discharged based on pre-textual 
                                                      
123. There is a trend, based on the language of the C.P.C. enacted in 2016, art. 77, paragraph 6 
(parties and attorneys have a duty to faithfully comply with judicial orders and to not create obstacles to 
compliance) to make attorneys jointly liable to pay for bad-faith litigation fines.  C.P.C. art. 77.   
However, attorney discipline in Brazil is still a question to be treated exclusively by the Bar.  Id.  
124. Plaintiff Ann Hopkins was a senior manager at Price Waterhouse accounting partnership 
when she was considered for partnership, in 1982.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 
(1989).  Because her candidacy was put on hold for reconsideration, and because in the following year 
she was not reconsidered for partnership, she sued under Title VII charging that she had been 
discriminated against on the basis of sex.  Id.  The District Court found for the plaintiff, reasoning that 
the employer made such decisions consciously giving effect to partners' evaluations based on sex 
stereotyping, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that that when a plaintiff 
proves that gender was a motivating factor of the decision, defendant may avoid liability by showing by 
a preponderance of the evidence it would make the same decision irrespective of the plaintiff's gender.  
Id. at 260.  The Court reversed and remanded only because the lower courts had decided that defendant 
had to make such proof by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. 
125. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233, 256. 
126. Id. at 233. 
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negligence. 127  The appellate court found that the employer’s harassment 
was intended to coerce her to waive pregnancy tenure by resignation, and 
awarded her $50,000 in damages and back pay.128  The highest labor court 
(T.S.T.) doubled the back pay, recognizing that her discharge was 
discriminatory.129  While statistics as to the judgment and settlement awards 
for gender discrimination in Brazil are not available, this author’s own 
experience shows that this case is on the higher end of the spectrum.   
In contrast, in the United States, such an award would be on the lower 
end.  According to the search engine Westlaw Next, there were 430 sexual 
harassment cases with judgments or settlements up to $50,000.130  
However, such search engine listed 1,389 cases which had judgments or 
settlements above that amount, including 105 cases between $1–2 million, 
78 cases between $2–5 million, and 44 cases over $5 million.131  For 
instance, in Ingraham v. UBS Fin. Servs., the company retaliated against an 
employee and eventually discharged her after she complained about being 
sexually harassed by her superior.132  The jury awarded her $350,000 
damages on the sexual harassment claim, $242,000 damages on the 
retaliation claim, as well as an additional $10,000,000 in punitive damages 
on the retaliation claim.133   
D. Limitations of the Current Statutory Text and the Lack of Binding 
Precedent in Brazil  
In Brazil, another factor that hinders the development of gender 
discrimination litigation might be its more limited statutory protection in 
relation to the United States, and the lack of binding effect of case law.  In 
comparing the anti-discrimination statutory provisions in Brazil and the 
United States, one may notice that the Brazilian legislation provides a 
                                                      
127. RR 11184048.2007.5.05.0020, Relator:  Min. Alexandre Agra Belmonte, TRIBUNAL 
SUPERIOR DO TRABALHO JURISPRUDÊNCIA [T.S.T.J.] de 13.11.2013 (Braz.), https://consultortrabalhista. 
com/decisoes-trabalhistas/tst-embargos-de-declaracao-em-recurso-de-revista-empregada-gestantedispen 
sa-discriminatoria-percepca/. 
128. Id. 
129. Id.; Lei 9.029, de 13 de Abril de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 4 de 
13.4.1995 (Braz.) (citing Brazilian law awards doubled back pay when an unlawful discharge results 
from discrimination); see Labor & Employment Jury Verdicts & Settlements, WESTLAW NEXT (Apr. 18, 
2015). 
130. Labor & Employment Jury Verdicts & Settlements, see supra note 129. 
131. Id. 
132. See generally Verdict and Settlement Summary, Ingraham v. UBS Fin. Servs., 2011 WL 
232381 (Mo. Cir.). 
133. Id.  
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narrower scope of protection, even though it does not limit the protected 
classes to the expressly listed ones.134  The Brazilian statutes on point are 
less detailed than Title VII and do not expressly mention any equivalent to 
a disparate impact theory of employment discrimination.135  That might be 
the reason why the cases that reach the Brazilian courts are either the ones 
literally covered in some statutory provision (often not requiring 
discriminatory intent), or the ones involving obvious discrimination. 136   
Additionally, even though Brazilian judges may interpret and apply 
the existing provisions in creative manners, as the circumstances require,137 
such decisions have had a smaller reach because they were usually not 
binding on lower courts.138  In contrast, the United States’ judicial decisions 
have a strong impact on shaping social behavior, as they bind lower judges 
for future cases, advising society of what is legal and what is not.  These 
decisions receive significant public attention and sometimes even provoke 
the intervention of the legislator.139  Employment discrimination case law 
has added many layers to the Title VII provisions, to the point that 
                                                      
134. See supra note 136–43 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra Part II, Section B.  
136. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.  For example, in RR 
106240071.2005.5.09.0005, the T.S.T. affirmed the regional decision finding that the discharge of an 
employee because of her family responsibilities with her young child, was discriminatory.  RR No. 
106240071.2005.5.09.0005, Relator:  Min. Fernando Eizo Ono, TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DO TRABALHO 
JURISPRUDÊNCIA [T.S.T.J.] de 30.11.2011, https://consultortrabalhista.com/decisoes-trabalhistas/tst-
embargos-de-declaracao-em-recurso-de-revista-empregada-gestante-dispensa-discriminatoria-percepca/ 
(reasoning that the employer dismissed the complaint based on the unsupported assumption that her 
performance could be compromised by motherhood, unfairly withdrawing her means of support in the 
moment most needed).  The court affirmed the reinstatement of the employee even though the period of 
job security due to pregnancy had already lapsed, finding that the real issue was the discriminatory 
motivation of the discharge based on her family status.  Id.  Family status is an expressly protected class.  
See Lei No. 9.029, de 13 de Abril de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 1, 17.4.1995 
(Braz.). 
137. “[I]n Brazil it is not possible to find entire bodies of law created by judges in the vacuum 
of statutory rules, such as in the common law countries.”  See Pritsch, supra note 64 at 91.  However, 
“[t]he French Revolution’s dogma that the Judiciary branch should only apply—and not interpret—the 
law designed by the Legislative branch has long been proven impracticable and abandoned.  Id.  
“[J]udges are expected to ensure full normative force to the constitutional principles, using them to fill 
statutory gaps, to interpret the existing statutes, or to find those statutes unconstitutional.  Id.  (citing 
Barroso, supra note 14, at 356). 
138. Pritsch, supra note 64 at 85.  That has traditionally been the rule in Brazil.  However, to 
reduce the massive overburden on the courts, judicial reforms in the last years have progressively 
introduced binding precedents.  Such trend may dramatically increase after 2016, when a new Code of 
Civil procedure came into effect, attributing binding effect to en banc decisions and to some other 
important types of precedents.  Id.  All panel decided cases, however, remain as merely persuasive 
precedent.  See id. 
139. See, e.g., THE CIV. RIGHTS ACT of 1991. 
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employment discrimination outgrew employment law, being offered as a 
separate course at law schools and earning separate casebooks. 140   
This richness of information in American employment discrimination 
law likely provides better guidance about the law and litigation perspectives 
to employers, employees and legal professionals, in sharp contrast to the 
course this type of law has been taking in Brazil.  Part of this situation may 
change due to the new Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, effective in 
March 2016, which has introduced in the Brazilian legal system a binding 
effect to some types of appellate decisions.141  As it happens in the United 
States, with time, the judicial resolution of concrete cases tends to enrich 
the existing law, offering added guidance to prospective parties and legal 
professionals.  Nevertheless, more has to be done to reduce gender 
discrimination in Brazil, as this paper discusses in Part V.   
V. WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT?  NEW LEGISLATION, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS’ 
INVESTIGATIONS, AND INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS 
In light of the shortcomings described above, this article proposes 
three actions to help reduce gender discrimination in Brazil using the 
corresponding judicial remedies:  the enactment of new legislation, the 
increased use of the public prosecutors’ investigatory powers, and 
information campaigns.   
As to statutory change, the prospective legislation mentioned in Part 
II-C could be a good alternative.  It provides more detailed and complete 
treatment of workplace discrimination, including an equivalent to the 
disparate impact theory142 and workplace bullying,143 affirmative actions,144 
and policies for balanced family responsibilities.145  It also deters 
discrimination by the denial of public financing and publication of a 
discriminatory employer’s list,146 and creates equality commissions within 
each mid-size and large employer.147  Such statutory scheme, along with the 
forthcoming introduction of binding precedents in Brazil would create tools 
to litigate gender discrimination more akin to the ones available in the 
                                                      
140. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
141. CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] art. 489, § 1, VI, art. 927 de 16.3.2015 (Braz). 
142. Lei No. 6.653, de 15 de Dezembro de 2009, PROJETO DE LEI [P.L.] art. 4. de 16.12.2009 
(Braz.) 
143. Id. art. 27. 
144. Id. art. 2, ¶ 3, art. 3.   
145. Id. art. 5. 
146. Id. arts. 23–24. 
147. Lei No. 6.653, P.L. art. 34 (Braz.). 
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American legal system. 148  That could increase the numbers and efficacy of 
gender discrimination litigation in Brazil.   
Another possible course of action could be the increased focus of 
public prosecutors in the area of gender discrimination.  The Brazilian law 
grants prosecutors, even in civil matters, special investigatory powers not 
held by private attorneys. 149  Public prosecutors’ requests for documents 
are equivalent to a court order, subjecting a noncompliant party to 
prosecution for criminal contempt.150  Additionally, prosecutors may 
subpoena a witness for an out-of-court deposition under oath, a power also 
not held by private attorneys in Brazil.151  Therefore, the odds of 
uncovering a specific employer’s acts or policies showing a disparate 
impact, as well as obtaining any damaging documents, are much greater 
through public prosecutors.  Possessing such information, prosecutors may 
have leverage to enter into a consent decree with such employer or to 
prosecute a successful class action.152   
Finally, educational campaigns reaching employees and employers 
could improve awareness about what constitutes gender discrimination and 
its legal consequences.  The rarity of litigation, despite considerable gender 
discrimination in Brazil, shows the limitations of the current system.  The 
mere existence of anti-discrimination law has not been enough to change 
the workplace culture.  It has not placed possible plaintiff-employees on 
notice of all forms of discrimination.  These employees might not even 
recognize some forms of discrimination, such as seeing as acceptable the 
discretionary promotion of men at much higher rates than those of 
women.153  Additionally, the mere existence of the current anti-
discrimination legislation has not been sufficient to change employers’ 
attitudes towards gender discrimination.  Most employers do not even know 
how to deal with the issue of gender discrimination.154   
                                                      
148. See id. art. 5. 
149. Lei Complementar No. 75, de 20 de Maio de 1993, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
art. 8, II, IV, § 3, de 21.5.1995 (Braz.). 
150. Id. art. 8, II, IV, § 3. 
151. Id. art. 8, I, IX, § 3. 
152. Sérgio P. Marçal & Lucas Pinto Simão, Brazil:  The Class Actions Law Review – Edition 
1, L. REVS. (May 2017), http://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-class-actions-law-review-edition-
1/1141375/brazil (explaining that Brazilian class actions may not be filed by individual class 
representatives, but only by associations, unions, public defender’s office, government or prosecutors). 
153. Telephone Interview with Fabiano Holz Beserra, then Chief-Prosecutor of the 
Procuradoria Regional do Trabalho da 4ª Região [Labor Prosecutors’ Office for the 4th Region] (Mar. 9, 
2015). 
154. See supra Part III, Section B. 
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Gender equality could be improved through education.  Campaigns 
about the promotion of gender equality and the corresponding legal tools to 
enforce it could be promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor, the 
Prosecutor’s Office, the Judiciary, unions, and all organizations and 
agencies involved in the promotion of equality in the workplace.  This 
could disseminate and increase the information about gender discrimination 
as well as contribute decisively to the enforcement of anti-discrimination 
laws in Brazil.   
VI. CONCLUSION  
Even though workplace rights in Brazil have prominence, employment 
discrimination litigation is almost nonexistent, in sharp contrast to what 
happens in the United States.  Why is that so?  The problem of gender 
discrimination in Brazil does exist, despite its anti-discrimination laws.  
Brazil does have constitutional and statutory provisions that promote 
equality and explicitly outlaw discrimination at the workplace, including 
gender discrimination.  However, employment discrimination claims in 
Brazilian federal courts are eight times less than in the United States, and 
gender discrimination claims are twenty-five times less than in the United 
States.155  That does not mean that, in Brazil, discrimination on the basis of 
gender is less of a problem than in the United States.  Women in Brazil earn 
only 73.7% compared to men, despite being more educated than men.156  In 
the United States, that ratio is 81%.157  Within this scenario, this paper 
proposes four explanations for the relatively lower numbers of gender 
discrimination suits in Brazil.   
First, cases in the United States that would be litigated as employment 
discrimination claims may be brought in Brazil under more straightforward 
causes of action, without the daunting task of showing discriminatory 
intent.  For example, in the United States, sexual harassment due to an 
abusive work environment must be “severe or pervasive” from an objective 
and subjective standpoint.158  Additionally, it must affect the conditions of 
employment because of the plaintiff’s sex.159  In Brazil, abusive work 
environment harassment is illegal per se, regardless of the relation to the 
victim’s gender.160  In addition, a Brazilian pregnant woman has tenure 
until five months after birth or else she will be entitled to choose 
                                                      
155. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
158. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
159. Id. 
160. See supra note 99–102 and accompanying text. 
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reinstatement and back pay, or the wages and benefits of the entire tenure 
period.161  Even though the proof of discriminatory intent to the discharge 
may double the back pay amount, it is not essential to prove it, as it is in the 
United States.162   
Second, the lack of more aggressive truth-finding procedures such as 
those available in the United States makes it more difficult to prove 
discrimination cases in Brazil.  As a result, unless there is a “smoking gun” 
piece of evidence, discrimination cases are rarely litigated.  In the United 
States, discovery procedures for the request of documents, interrogatories, 
and depositions are enforceable by harsh procedural sanctions, contempt of 
court, perjury prosecutions, and by attorney disciplinary procedures 
prosecuted by the Bar before the courts.163  In Brazil, there is less 
enforcement of the truth-finding process, as successful perjury convictions 
of witnesses are rare, and there is no imprisonment for contempt of court.164  
Sanctions are lower than in the United States, and Brazilian judges may not 
directly apply them to attorneys, whose exclusive disciplinary forum is the 
Bar, without supervision by the courts.165  All of this lowers deterrence and 
allows for an undesirable lack of candor or withholding of damaging 
documents.  Further, because there are no depositions, but only shorter 
testimonies heard at trial, they are less likely to uncover all of the necessary 
facts.166 
Third, another factor that might contribute to the low numbers of 
gender discrimination litigation in Brazil is the significantly lower value of 
judgment awards in relation to the United States.167  This likely provides 
insufficient incentives to litigate the more complex gender discrimination 
cases in Brazil.  For instance, while a $50,000 judgment for gender 
discrimination in Brazil would be at the higher end of the spectrum, in the 
United States such an award would be in the lower end.  Most of the 
judgments or settlements in such cases exceed $50,000, and many surpass 
$2–5 million.168   
Fourth, the more limited statutory protection in Brazil, compared to 
the United States, and the lack of binding effect of case law, hinder the 
development of gender discrimination litigation.  The Brazilian legislation 
provides a narrower scope of protection, despite its non-exhaustive 
                                                      
161. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra note 112, 136 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra notes 127–33 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text. 
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protected class list.169  The Brazilian provisions are less detailed than Title 
VII, and do not expressly outlaw disparate impact discrimination.170  
Additionally, judicial decisions in Brazil are usually not binding on lower 
courts.171  Therefore, they do not add new layers to anti-discrimination 
provisions in the way that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions 
have done for the past few decades.172  As a result, the American 
employment discrimination law likely provides better guidance about the 
law and litigation perspectives to employers, employees and legal 
professionals.  That may change, in part, when the new Brazilian Code of 
Civil Procedure became effective, after March 2016, introducing into the 
Brazilian legal system a binding effect to all appellate case law.173   
As possible courses of action to address such problems, this paper 
proposes the enactment of new legislation, the increased use of the 
Brazilian public prosecutors’ special investigatory powers, and information 
campaigns.   
There is a bill waiting to be voted on at the Brazilian Congress since 
2009, which could be a good alternative.  It provides a more comprehensive 
treatment of workplace discrimination, regulating in some detail disparate 
impact, workplace bullying, affirmative actions and family responsibilities 
policies, and creating equality commissions within each mid-size and large 
employer.174  Along with binding precedents recently introduced into 
Brazilian law, the enactment of such bill could provide a better legal 
support for gender discrimination litigation in Brazil.   
As to public prosecutors, the Brazilian law grants them special 
investigatory powers not held by private attorneys—they may order the 
production of documents and subpoena witnesses for an out-of-court 
deposition under oath.175  Their likelihood of uncovering, for example, a 
specific employer’s acts or policies that generate disparate impact, or of 
obtaining key documents held by the employer, is much greater than that of 
private attorneys.  Therefore, the focus of public prosecutors in gender 
discrimination claims could be very useful to increase gender equality in 
Brazil.   
Finally, the educational campaigns reaching employees and employers 
could improve awareness about what constitutes gender discrimination and 
its legal consequences.  The mere existence of the anti-discrimination law 
                                                      
169. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
171. See Pritsch supra note 64, at 85 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra note 137–40 and accompanying text. 
173. See Pritsch supra note 64, at 85 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra notes 142–48 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
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has not been enough to change the workplace culture.  Employees often do 
not recognize some forms of gender discrimination, and most employers do 
not even know how to deal with the issue.  Campaigns about the promotion 
of gender equality and the corresponding legal tools to enforce it could 
disseminate and increase the relevant information and contribute decisively 
to the enforcement of the anti-discrimination laws in Brazil. 
 
